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Charles 0. Galvin *
I. WILLS
Construction. In Rubio v. Valdez' a devise was made to a son "upon his
paying to my other children, over a period of no more than twelve (12)
years, the total sum"'2 of $10,000 in specified amounts. The son died with-
out making the payments, and the other children contended that the estate
never vested in him because of his failure to fulfill the condition. The son's
heirs contended that he was vested with a fee simple estate, subject only to
a charge on the land. In a case of first impression, the court of civil ap-
peals sustained the latter construction, holding that the amount was se-
cured by a preferential lien on the property.3
Wilson v. Clay4 involved a lapsed legacy. Ethel and Edith were sisters
who executed identical wills and codicils. Each made specific devises of
certain real property to their niece, Mary, subject to a life estate in the
surviving testatrix. Mary predeceased the two testatrices so that the de-
vises under the two wills lapsed pursuant to section 68 of the Texas Pro-
bate Code.5 Mary left surviving her an adopted daughter, Anne, who
contended that the lapsed devises did not fall into the residue of the estate
but passed by intestate succession. The residuary beneficiaries contended
that the two testatrices meant all their property to be disposed of under
their wills; therefore, the lapsed devises passed with the other properties
under the residuary clauses of the two wills. The court of civil appeals
stated that, absent a clear showing in the documents that the lapsed devises
should be excluded from the residuary estates, the devises properly passed
into the residue. 6 The court held that in the instant case "the residuary
clause is routinely plain and simple" 7 and covered any property not other-
* B.S.C., Southern Methodist University; M.B.A., J.D., Northwestern University;
S.J.D., Harvard University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. 603 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. Id
3. Id at 348.
4. 593 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
5. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 68 (Vernon 1980) provides:
Where a testator shall devise or bequeath an estate or interest of any kind
by will to a child or other descendant of such testator, should such devisee or
legatee, during the lifetime of such testator, die leaving children or descend-
ants who shall survive such testator, such devise or legacy shall not lapse by
reason of such death, but the estate so devised or bequeathed shall vest in the
children or descendants of such legatee or devisee in the same manner as if he
had survived the testator and died intestate.
6. 593 S.W.2d at 728; cf. Estate of Self, 591 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,
no writ) (in the absence of a residuary clause, property goes to heirs at law).
7. 593 S.W.2d at 728.
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wise disposed of under the will.8
Jensen v. Cunningham9 also involved reciprocal wills with identical
clauses. The questioned provision stated: "One share to be divided equal-
ly between my daughter. . . and my following named grandchildren who
are then surviving. . . ."10 In a suit brought by the bank as independent
executor for construction of the above clause, the trial judge ordered that
the daughter should be treated as a class entitled to one-half the corpus of
a trust and the grandchildren should be treated as a class entitled to the
other half of the trust."I The court of civil appeals confirmed the trial
court's construction of the disputed clause, holding that from a reading of
the will as a whole the intention was clear that the testators, husband and
wife, meant to provide for one another for the remaining life of the survi-
vor, then to provide for their daughter, with the remainder over to surviv-
ing grandsons. 12 The court found that the use of "between . . . and"
meant an equal division between the daughter and the grandchildren as a
group. 13
To/er v. Harbour 14 presented the question of the application of the Rule
in Shelley's case to a direction that "my son. . . shall. . . have and hold a
life-estate only . . . . [and] at his death his heirs take the fee simple ti-
tle."' 5 Although the rule was abolished effective January 1, 1964,16 the
will in the instant case was probated before that date. The court of civil
appeals stated that the former rule operated as a positive rule of law and
not as a matter of construction dependent upon the testator's intent.17
Therefore, the court held that the devise to the son of a life estate with a
remainder to his heirs operated automatically as a devise of the fee sim-
ple. 18
Johnson v. Stark 19 concerned the construction of a will in which a hus-
band left properties to his wife for life with broad powers of control and
sale.20 Upon her death the properties were designated to pass to particular
remaindermen. For twenty-five years after the husband's death his wife
dealt with her husband's estate as if she owned the property, making sales
and conveyances of much of it. Upon her death the beneficiaries of the
remainder interests under her husband's will sought a construction of the
8. Id
9. 596 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
10. Id at 267-68 (emphasis in original).
11. Id at 268.
12. Id at 270.
13. Id.
14. 589 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
15. Id at 530.
16. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1291a (Vernon 1980).
17. 589 S.W.2d at 532 (citing Sybert v. Sybert, 152 Tex. 106, 254 S.W.2d 999 (1953)).
18. 589 S.W.2d at 532.
19. 585 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
20. Concerning the various properties bequeathed, the will stated: "and to be by her
sold and conveyed, by fee simple title or otherwise, all in any manner, for any purposes, and




husband's will. The probate court determined that the remainder interest
beneficiaries were entitled to trace the proceeds of all sales made by the
surviving wife. 21 The court of civil appeals, in reversing and rendering
judgment, construed the will as giving the wife complete discretion with
respect to sales of property during her lifetime; only that property of the
husband that remained undisposed of at the time of his wife's death would
pass to the remainder beneficiaries under the husband's will. 22 From a
reading of the will as a whole, the court construed the language as giving
the first taker, the wife, the largest estate possible. 23
Proof. Section 59 of the Texas Probate Code24 requires that a will written
not wholly in the handwriting of the testator be attested to by two or more
proper witnesses who shall subscribe their names in the presence of the
testator. In Morris v. Estate of West 25 the attestation clause recited that the
subscribing witnesses signed their names in the presence of the testator;
depositions of the witnesses and the attorney who prepared the will and
supervised its execution showed, however, that the witnessing was not
done in the presence of the testator. A summary judgment was entered
denying probate. 26 The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that the attestation clause makes a prima facie case that the wit-
nessing was properly done.27 The court reasoned that the depositions
taken merely contradicted the attestation clause and thus raised an issue of
fact that should have been tried. 28
The statutory rules for the proving of lost wills were before the court in
Howard Hughes Medical Institute v. LumMis. 29 Hughes died on April 5,
1976, and on April 14, 1976, Hughes's aunt, Lummis, filed for letters of
temporary administration, primarily to find Hughes's will. On February
19, 1977, the Howard Hughes Medical Institute made an appearance,
21. Id at 901.
22. Id at 904.
23. Id at 904-05. One other construction case is worthy of mention. In El Paso Nat'l
Bank v. Shriner's Hosp. for Crippled Children, 588 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979, writ granted), the court held that in the absence of a statement of facts an appellate
court must presume that sufficient evidence was introduced to support the findings of the
trial court. Id at 412 (citing Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1968)) [Edi-
tor's Note: After this Article went to print, the supreme court reversed the decision of the El
Paso court of civil appeals, holding that the lower court erred in affirming the trial court
judgment on the basis of the lack of a statement of facts. 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 322, 323 (Apr. 4,
1981).]
24. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980Y provides:
Every last will and testament, except where otherwise provided by law, shall
be in writing and signed by the testator in person or by another person for him
by his direction and in his presence, and shall, if not wholly in the handwriting
of the testator, be attested by two (2) or more credible witnesses above the age
of fourteen (14) years who shall subscribe their names thereto in their own
handwriting in the presence of the testator.
25. 602 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. Id at 123.
27. Id at 123-24; see Nichols v. Rowan, 422 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. 602 S.W.2d at 124.
29. 596 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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claiming that Hughes executed a last will leaving his entire estate to the
institute. Lummis sought a declaratory judgment that the will claimed by
the institute was not a valid last will of Hughes, and on April 6, 1978, her
motion for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action was
granted.30 The court of civil appeals stated that the Texas Probate Code
provides for the proving and finding of lost wills3' and, in particular, pro-
vides for a four-year period from the decedent's death within which a will
may be offered for probate.32 In this case the four-year period would have
expired on April 5, 1980. The court, therefore, reversed the summary
judgment because it invalidly shortened the statutory four-year period.33
Testamentary Capacity, Undue Influence. In Estate of Wilson v. Wilson 34
the will of Asie Wilson was denied probate on the ground that Leon Wil-
son had exercised undue influence on Asie Wilson at the time she made
her will.35 As evidence of a relationship in which undue influence could
have been exercised, the probate court admitted a judgment in a prior
cause of action in which a deed from Asie Wilson to Leon Wilson was
cancelled because of the undue influence Leon exercised on Asie. The
court of civil appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the prior judg-
ment was inadmissible because the subject matter of the two actions was
not the same; 36 the prior judgment concerned a deed, whereas the current
suit concerned a will.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of civil
appeals and remanded the case to that court.37 The supreme court noted
that in the instant case Leon Wilson had himself offered into evidence the
very deed that was the subject of the prior judgment. 38 Thus, the court
reasoned, Leon Wilson made the prior judgment relevant to the will con-
test and, pursuant to article 3731 a, section 1 of the Texas Revised Civil
Statutes, 39 the prior judgment was admissible. 40 On remand the court of
civil appeals reviewed all the evidence and found that the decedent had
testamentary capacity and that the jury's finding to the contrary was erro-
neous.41 The court found that while the evidence did establish an influ-
ence by Leon over Asie, it was insufficient to prove undue influence over
30. Id at 173.
31. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 84-85 (Vernon 1980).
32. 596 S.W.2d at 173; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 73 (Vernon 1980).
33. 596 S.W.2d at 173-74.
34. 587 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1979).
35. Id.
36. 581 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979).
37. 587 S.W.2d at 675.
38. Id. at 674-75.
39. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3731a, § I (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) provides:
Any written instrument, certificate, [or] record . . . made by an officer of this
State or of any governmental subdivision thereof, or by his deputy, or person
or employee under his supervision, in the performance of the functions of his
office and employment, shall be, so far as relevant, admitted in the courts of
this State ....
40. 587 S.W.2d at 675.
41. 593 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
[Vol. 35
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her at the time she executed her will.42 The case was remanded for a new
trial to determine the existence or nonexistence of undue influence at the
time of the making of the will.
43
In Speck v. Speck44 the probate court had allowed one counsel to ask a
witness: "At the time she signed this instrument was she or was she not
rational?"45 The court of civil appeals held that the question did not call
for a conclusion by the witness as to testamentary capacity, but was merely
a statement as to the witness's view about the condition of the decedent's
mind.46 Accordingly, the court ruled that the probate court did not com-
mit reversible error in overruling the objection to the question.47
Gillispie v. Reinhardt48 concerned a question of testamentary capacity in
the execution of a holographic will. The court of civil appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgment that a valid will existed.4 9 The court concluded that
once the handwriting of the testatrix was proved and the will was found in
all respects to be valid, a prima facie case was made out.50 Because the
contestants failed to overcome that prima facie case in their attempt to
show that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity at the time she made
the will, the court upheld its validity. 51
In In re Estate of Willenbrock52 the parties stipulated that the testatrix
had testamentary capacity; the only issue was whether the attorney for the
testatrix unduly influenced her. The jury determined that the attorney did
unduly influence the testatrix to include him in her will. The trial court
disregarded the jury finding and admitted the will to probate. 53 On appeal
the court of civil appeals affirmed, stating that the contestants showed by
the testimony of their witnesses only that the attorney had the opportunity
to influence the testatrix, not that he had done so.54 The court stated that
the fact that the attorney was in a fiduciary relationship with the testatrix
would not, standing alone, be sufficient to raise the issue of undue influ-
ence.
55
In Folsom v. Folsom 56 the probate court found the proponent of the will,
Edgar, to have unduly influenced his brother, William, to leave his entire
estate to him to the exclusion of William's children. 57 Moreover, the alter-
42. Id
43. Id
44. 588 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ).
45. Id at 854.
46. Id
47. Id
48. 596 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
49. Id at 560.
50. Id at 561; see Farr v. Bell, 460 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
51. 596 S.W.2d at 560-61.
52. 603 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53. Id at 349.
54. Id at 350-51.
55. Id at 351; see Boyer v. Pool, 154 Tex. 586, 280 S.W.2d 564 (1955); Lipper v. Wes-
low, 369 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ refd n.r.e.).
56. 601 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ reftd n.r.e.).
57. Id at 81.
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nate beneficiary was Edgar's son, not the children of William. The court
of civil appeals affirmed.58 The evidence showed that the testator was an
alcoholic, that he was weak from cancer therapy on the day he executed
the will, that the will was prepared by his brother's attorney, that his
mother and father had just died, and that he died just five weeks after he
executed the will. The evidence showed that he loved his children and that
there was some question whether he even liked the brother's son, who was
named alternate beneficiary. Based on all the facts, the court concluded
that the evidence clearly supported a finding of undue influence. 59
The question whether the opportunity to exercise undue influence was in
fact an effective exercise was raised in Henderson v. Sims. 60 The children
of the first marriage contended that the wife and children of the second
marriage unduly influenced the testator. The jury found that undue influ-
ence had been exercised, but the trial judge entered a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 61 The court of civil appeals affirmed, holding on
review of all the evidence that an issue of undue influence had not been
raised for submission to the jury.62 The court stated that facts that only
show an opportunity to exercise influence will not suffice to set aside a
will.63
Nuncupative Will. In Dabney v. Thomas64 the court of civil appeals ap-
plied the rules for proof of an oral or nuncupative will. 65 The court stated
that proof must be of the clearest and most convincing character, 66 that the
testimony of three witnesses must be in substantial agreement, 67 and that
58. Id.
59. Id. See also In re Estate of Hensarling, 590 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, no writ) (daughter's undue influence over her father).
Another undue influence case, Sebesta v. Stavinoha, 590 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.), dealt with the issues of testamentary capacity and
undue influence. Testamentary capacity requires that the testator have some idea of the
nature and extent of his property and recognize those who would be the natural objects of
his bounty. See Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1963). Undue influence is the
exertion of such influence that subverts or overpowers the testator's mind so that he executes
a will that he would not have executed but for such influence. Id at 922. In either situation,
testamentary incapacity or undue influence, the condition must exist on the date the will was
executed. Id at 923. Testimony of events at other times has probative force that merely
demonstrates that the condition persists and has probability of existence when the will was
executed. See Lee v. Lee, 424 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1968). In Sebesla the court of civil appeals,
on reviewing the evidence, held that there was sufficient evidence of probative force, albeit
contradicted, to support a jury finding that the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity.
590 S.W.2d at 718. See also Spruance v. Northway, 601 S.W.2d 153, 156-57 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1980, writ refd n.r.e.) (testamentary capacity may be affected if the person is
laboring under an insane delusion such that the person made a disposition different from
that which the person otherwise would make).
60. 591 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
61. Id at 594.
62. Id at 597.
63. Id; see Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 923 (Tex. 1963).
64. 596 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
65. Id at 563-64; see Comment, The Nuncupaive Will, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 77 (1966).
66. 596 S.W.2d at 562-63; see Hargis v. Nance, 159 Tex. 263, 271, 317 S.W.2d 922, 926
(1958).
67. 596 S.W.2d at 563; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 86(c) (Vernon 1980).
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the transaction must be in a setting in which the decedent is "in ex-
tremis.'' 68 In the instant case the three witnesses were not in agreement as
to what the deceased had said. Furthermore, the decedent lived twenty-
seven days after making the alleged will, and there was no evidence that he
was in a critical state when the oral statement was given. Accordingly, the
court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment that no valid nun-
cupative will existed.69
Joint and Mutual Wills. A joint will may be one that is not contractual, so
that after the death of one of the testators, the survivor may revoke the will
and do as he wishes with his estate. If the joint will is contractual, how-
ever, and the survivor revokes, a constructive trust may be placed on some
or all of the property by the beneficiaries under the original will.70 In No-
vak v. Stevens71 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the subject of what
constitutes the indicia of contract in such a will. Because the joint will in
Novak spoke of "the purpose of making the best deposition of our worldly
affairs," "our last will and testament," and "'all of our estate. . . after both
our deaths,"72 the court held that the will was contractual on its face. 73
Thus, the court ruled that because the survivor revoked the will and made
a later will, a constructive trust for the beneficiaries under the first will was
properly imposed on the estate.74
In Fisher v. Capp 75 the husband and wife executed a joint and mutual
will leaving their estates one to the other with remainders over. After the
husband's death, his will was duly probated. Subsequently, the wife re-
voked the will and executed a new will disposing of the estate in a manner
different from the joint will. A residuary beneficiary under the joint will
established in the trial court that the joint will was contractual and that the
beneficiaries thereunder were entitled to the protection of their respective
shares under the joint will. The court of civil appeals affirmed, stating that
the will indicated that each spouse left his or her estate to the survivor and
then jointly planned the disposition of whatever the survivor had at his or
her death.76 By so doing, the court ruled that each spouse bound himself
or herself to the other to carry out the joint plan; this promise was the
contract that became enforceable against the survivor after the first spouse
died.77
Contract Not to Make a Will. In McFarland v. Haby78 a mother agreed
68. 596 S.W.2d 564; see McClain v. Adams, 135 Tex. 627, 629, 146 S.W.2d 373, 374-75
(1941).
69. 596 S.W.2d at 564.
70. See Weidner v. Crowther, 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 62 (1957).
71. 596 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1980).
72. Id at 851-52 (emphasis by the court).
73. Id at 852-53.
74. Id at 853.
75. 597 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.).
76. Id at 399.
77. Id
78. 589 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1981]
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not to make a will and stipulated how her children would share in her
estate. Upon her death, however, she left a will and codicil that were ad-
mitted to probate. A son who was excluded under the will sought to en-
force the contract not to make a will and impose a trust on the property for
the share he would take as an heir. The district court sustained the son's
action to enforce the contract. 79 The court of civil appeals reversed, hold-
ing the contract void. 80 The court adopted the rule adhered to by other
states that a person may contract for a consideration not to make a will in
order to permit his estate to descend by the laws of intestacy. 81 When, as
here, however, the contract was not to invoke the laws of intestacy, but to
change such statutory rules by contract, the court held that such contract
was void and unenforceable. 82
Injunctive Relief. In Lucik v. Taylor 83 the Texas Supreme Court dealt with
the important question of whether the probate court can give injunctive
relief. Lucik died, leaving his surviving widow as the principal beneficiary
under a 1977 will, which she filed for probate. A 1978 will was filed for
probate by Taylor, who was the named principal beneficiary in that will.
Both applications for probate were consolidated in the same proceeding.
On August 22, 1978, Hartnett was appointed temporary administrator of
the estate. Prior to the appointment of the temporary administrator the
surviving widow filed an application to enjoin Taylor and her representa-
tive from dealing in any way with the estate. The probate court issued a
temporary restraining order in broad terms.84 The court of civil appeals
reversed on the ground that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to give
injunctive relief because the matter involved the personal interests of the
widow and was not for the benefit of the estate. 85 The supreme court held
that the matter concerned the protection of the assets of the estate; accord-
ingly, pursuant to the Probate Code in effect at that time 86 the probate
court of Dallas County had the power to issue the injunction.87
Gentry v. Marburger88 also involved the power to grant injunctive relief.
79. Id at 522.
80. Id at 525.
81. Id at 523.
82. Id at 524.
83. 596 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. 1980); see Galvin, Wills and Trusts, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 21, 31 (1980).
84. 596 S.W.2d at 515.
85. Id at 514.
86. 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 448, § 1, at 1170 provides:
All courts exercising original probate jurisdiction shall have the power to
hear all matters incident to an estate, including but not limited to, all claims
by or against an estate, all actions for trial of title to land incident to an estate
and for the enforcement of liens thereon incident to an estate, all actions for
trial of the right of property incident to an estate, and actions to construe wills.
When a surety is called on to perform in place of an administrator or guard-
ian, all courts exercising original probate jurisdiction may award judgment
against the personal representative in favor of his surety in the same suit.
87. 596 S.W.2d at 516.
88. 596 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
[Vol. 35
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The probate court considered an estate consisting of the wife's one-half
community interest in a house. An injunction involving the entire interest
in the house was granted in the district court.89 The heirs of a prior wife's
estate who sought to overturn the injunction urged that the district court
was without power to grant the injunction while the matter was pending in
the probate court. The court of civil appeals held, however, that although
the probate court was without power to deal with property not before it in
administration, and at the time of the granting of the injunctive relief the
husband's half of the community was not in administration in the probate
court, the district court was the proper court for granting the injunction.90
Jurisdiction. In Novak v. Stevens 91 two proponents of different wills made
applications in separate proceedings before the county court for the pro-
bate of the wills. Both contested applications were transferred to the dis-
trict court in which the two causes were consolidated for trial. On motions
for summary judgment by both proponents the district court granted judg-
ment in favor of one applicant and denied the motion of the other. 92 On
appeal the court of civil appeals held that the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion to consider the will contests and to construe the 1968 will to determine
whether it was contractual. 93 The supreme court reversed, holding that
pursuant to the 1973 amendment to article V, section 8 of the Texas Con-
stitution94 and the enabling legislation 95 a will contest and a suit for con-
struction could properly be heard in the same proceeding in the district
court. 96 Similarly, in English v. Cobb97 the Texas Supreme Court held that
in accordance with the 1973 Texas constitutional amendment and the en-
abling legislation, county courts sitting in probate have the 'fower to hear
all matters incident to an estate. ' '98 Thus the court ruled that the county
court at law sitting in probate was not subject to a jurisdictional limit of
$10,000.99
In a trespass to try title action brought against a foreign administrator
the court in Minga v. Perales'°° construed article 1982101 as mandatorily
89. Id. at 202.
90. Id at 202-03.
91. 596 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1980).
92. Id
93. 583 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979).
94. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8. The 1973 amendment to art. V, § 8 granted concurrent
probate jurisdiction to the district courts and abolished the provision that limited district
courts to appellate probate jurisdiction. See 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws, Proposed Constitutional
Amendments, at 2471-72.
95. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5 (Vernon 1980). Section 5 authorizes the transfer of
probate matters to district courts in counties in which no statutory probate court or other
statutory court exercising probate jurisdiction exists.
96. 596 S.W.2d at 851.
97. 593 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1979).
98. Id at 675-76 (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(d) (Vernon 1980) (emphasis by
the court); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-355, § l(b) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1965-
1980).
99. 593 S.W.2d at 675.
100. 603 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
101. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1982 (Vernon 1964).
1981]
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requiring the joinder of the heirs of the deceased. 0 2 Moreover, because
the foreign administrator was appointed by the courts of Tennessee and
had not qualified in any way to represent the decedent's estate with respect
to assets in Texas, the court ruled that he could not sue or be sued in
Texas.'0 3 A similar result was reached in KL Cattle Co. v. Bunker,' °4 in
which the federal district court held that a foreign executrix could be sued
only in her home state of Colorado because no ancillary administration
had been taken out in Texas.' 0 5 The suit had originally begun against an
individual who subsequently died. Had he continued to live, suit against
him in Texas probably would have been proper under the Texas long-arm
statute,' °6 but the Bunker court held that the statute does not extend to
nonresident personal representatives.1 0 7
Venue. In Moody v. Lewis 108 the court of civil appeals held that a suit by a
guardian to recover funds in a savings and loan association was properly
filed in the county in which the association was located. 10 9 In McCarty v.
Loftice110 the surviving children of the decedent brought suit against the
surviving spouse for conversion of the assets of the deceased. The court
held that, based on the allegations of the plaintiffs petition, the suit was
one for conversion and not for revision of the probate proceedings; there-
fore, venue was proper in Collin County, the county of the surviving
spouse's residence, rather than in Dallas County, the county in which the
decedent's will had been probated."' In Carter v. Carter1 2 the county
court of Bexar County sitting in probate entered an order overruling the
defendant's motion to transfer the case to Dallas County, her county of
residence." 13 The court of civil appeals held that the appeal was from an
interlocutory order rather than from a final judgment, and that no author-
ity existed in the Probate Code for such an appeal.' '4
Bill of Review. In Carson v. Estate of Carson "15 an administratrix obtained
approval from the probate court for the sale of* certain real property to pay
debts, claims, and taxes." 6 Carson, an interested party, was present at the
102. 603 S.W.2d at 241.
103. Id at 242.
104. 491 F. Supp. 1314 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
105. Id at 1316.
106. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (Vernon 1979).
107. 491 F. Supp. at 1316.
108. 596 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
109. Id at 320.
110. 587 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
111. Id at 548-49. The applicable venue provision states: "Suits to revise proceedings of
the county court in matters of probate must be brought in the district court of the county in
which such proceedings were had." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(18) (Vernon
1964).
112. 594 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
113. Id at 465.
114. Id at 466.
115. 601 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ retd n.r.e.).
116. See id at 173.
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hearing and agreed to the sale; he later sought a bill of review to set aside
the sale because of certain irregularities. On appeal he provided only a
transcript of the record without a statement of facts. The court of civil
appeals stated that every reasonable presumption consistent with the rec-
ord would be indulged in favor of the correctness of the order."17 The
court noted that although the irregularities complained of might render the
order voidable, they did not render it void. 1 8 The court concluded that
Carson failed to sustain the burden of showing fundamental error in the
order of sale." 19
Fees. In Rodeheaver v. Alridge120 the court of civil appeals held that under
the provisions of article 2072121 an administratrix was exempt from the
payment of the county clerk's fee of $25 for an action begun by her in the
probate court as well as from the constable's fee of $10 for service of the
citation. 22
Administration. Two cases that clarify certain matters relating to adminis-
tration were decided by the Texas Supreme Court during the survey pe-
riod. In Drake v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co. 123 Holt was appointed
administratrix for the estate of Duncan in Texas, while Drake was ap-
pointed executor of the estate pursuant to a will filed for probate in New
Hampshire. Drake sought to have the New Hampshire will admitted to
probate in Texas and to have Holt removed as administratrix. Holt em-
ployed Currie as counsel to resist the application to probate the New
Hampshire will. Drake prevailed and Holt was removed.' 24 Before the
removal, Currie filed a claim for legal services in the amount of $12,000
plus certain advances, which Holt allowed and which were approved by
the probate court. 125 On appeal the court of civil appeals reversed and
remanded on the grounds that Holt was acting in her individual capacity
when she employed Currie. 126 On remand the probate court ordered that
Holt and Currie reimburse the estate in full.' 27 On appeal from that order
the court of civil appeals reversed and remanded for a hearing concerning
any offsets that might be made to the amount owed the estate. 28 On this
second remand the probate court determined that Currie was entitled to
offset $5,000 for legal services properly chargeable to the estate and that
117. Id
118. Id at 174.
119. Id
120. 601 S.W.2d 51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
121. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2072 (Vernon 1964).
122. 601 S.W.2d at 54.
123. 600 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1980).
124. Id at 769; see Holt v. Drake, 505 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973,
no writ).
125. 600 S.W.2d at 770.
126. Drake v. Muse, Currie & Kohen, 532 S.W.2d 369, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1975), writ ref'd n.r.e per curiam, 535 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1976).
127. 600 S.W.2d at 770.




the balance owed the estate was a joint and several liability of Holt, Cur-
rie, and Trinity Universal, as surety for Holt. 29 On appeal the court of
civil appeals determined that Holt was primarily liable for $12,000, that
Trinity Universal was secondarily liable for $12,000, and that Currie was
not liable to the estate and was entitled to $5,000 for services rendered the
estate.13° The supreme court reversed, holding both Currie and Holt pri-
marily liable and Trinity Universal secondarily liable.' 3 1 The court stated
that even though Currie earned the money, and the amount was paid pur-
suant to the order of the probate court, the reversal of that order placed
upon both Currie and Holt the obligation to return the money to the es-
tate.' 32 The court added that failing such restitution, Trinity Universal
would be liable. 133 The litigation in this case was protracted and probably
more costly to all the parties than the amount in issue. One might well
counsel the parties in the case of a contested appointment to identify me-
ticulously those services that are personal to the representative and those
that relate to the conservation and administration of the estate.
In Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore134 a nephew attending an elderly
aunt obtained control of certain properties that the bank as administrator
sought to recover. The Texas Supreme Court ruled that, as a matter of
law, the evidence established a fiduciary relationship and that once the
relationship was established a presumption of unfairness and invalidity at-
tached to the transfers made to the nephew.' 35 The court found that the
nephew did not rebut this presumption.' 36 Chief Justice Greenhill dis-
sented, pointing out that the presumption of unfairness, coupled with the
dead man's statute, 137 places an onerous burden on one who undertakes to
assist an elderly person.'38
Independent Administration-Power of Sale. In Harper v. Swoveland 139 the
decedent devised certain property to his children. His wife as independent
executrix, acting pursuant to an express power to sell any and all of the
129. 600 S.W.2d at 770.
130. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Drake, 587 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1979), rev'd, 600 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1980); see Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Cross, 586
S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (accountants entitled to
recover against bank for services rendered to an estate).
131. 600 S.W.2d at 773.
132. Id at 771-72.
133. Id. at 772. See also Gulf Ins. Co. v. Blair, 589 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (temporary administrator who failed to file return and his
surety were liable to estate for losses).
134. 595 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1980).
135. Id at 507. But see Alexander v. Bowers, 595 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1980, no writ) (different result occurs when substantial evidence exists that decedent in-
tended to make a gift).
136. 595 S.W.2d at 507.
137. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3716 (1926).
138. 595 S.W.2d at 512. According to Chief Justice Greenhill, the presumption of un-
fairness places upon the assister the burden of explaining his transactions with the deceased,
but the dead man's statute prevents such testimony, "[slo he must, as a matter of law, ex-
plain; but he cannot explain." Id
139. 591 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
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decedent's property for "any reason," sold the property. The court held
that the executrix could properly exercise that power, as against the claims
of the specific devisees that the sale was invalid.' 40
Independent Administration-Fees. In Estate of Roots 14' the court of civil
appeals held that a bank could not be disqualified from acting as in-
dependent executor solely by reason of the fees that it proposed to
charge.' 42 Section 149A of the Probate Code 143 provides that under ap-
propriate circumstances an independent executor may be required to make
an accounting, including the justification of its fees, but the court stated
that such rules relate to the executor's services and not to the executor's
qualification. 144
Necessity of Administration. In Banks v. Hereford145 Alice Hereford died
intestate, and her husband filed an affidavit of heirship as sole heir. Banks,
mother of the deceased, was appointed administratrix of the estate because
of her allegation of necessity of administration to pay debts. Hereford
moved to dismiss Banks on the ground that no necessity existed for admin-
istration. Banks relied on the existence of an adopted child and separate
property of the deceased as warranting administration. The court of civil
appeals affirmed the trial court's removal of Banks, holding that the mere
existence of two heirs instead of one and the existence of separate property
were not determinative of the issue of necessity of administration, but were
only collateral to it. 146
Conflict of Interest. In Hitt v. Dumitrov147 Lon Coker, his wife Catherine,
and their two children were killed in a private airplane crash. Hitt, a
brother-in-law of Lon Coker, qualified as administrator of both spouses'
estates and took the position that certain insurance proceeds passed to
Lon's mother. Dumitrov, Catherine's mother, sought to remove Hitt as
administrator of Catherine's estate on the ground that a conflict of interest
existed. Section 47(b) of the Probate Code provides that in the case of
simultaneous deaths the proceeds of community insurance shall be divided
equally between the estates.' 48 Accordingly, Dumitrov contended that
Catherine's estate was entitled to have an administrator who would as-
sume an advocate's role as against the contentions made by those repre-
senting Lon's estate. The court of civil appeals affirmed the removal of
Hitt and the appointment of Dumitrov to represent Catherine's estate,
140. Id at 631.
141. 596 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
142. Id at 244; see, e.g., Walling v. Hubbard, 389 S.W.2d 581, 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1965, writ dism'd) (in an action for accounting, executor may have to justify his
compensation).
143. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149A (Vernon 1980).
144. 596 S.W.2d at 244.
145. 601 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
146. Id at 109-10.
147. 598 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).
148. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 47(b) (Vernon 1980).
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finding sufficient evidence of a conflict of interest on the part of Hitt as the
administrator of Catherine's estate. 149
Heirshoi-Contest. In Brown v. Crockett150 a party claiming to be an heir
filed a petition to declare heirship in the probate court of Dallas County.
Another party filed an application to declare heirship and a motion to re-
move the cause to the district court of Bastrop County. The later motion
was granted.151 The question on appeal was whether the dispute was a
"contested" probate matter within the meaning of section 5(b) of the Pro-
bate Code 152 so that it could be transferred to the district court. Constru-
ing the language of section 5(b) "as to give a reasonable and practical
effect to the statute," 153 the court of civil appeals stated that for purposes of
section 5(b), a probate matter is contested "when a pleading is filed which
sets out sufficient facts to show some reasonable grounds for the belief that
there are two or more parties or claimants to assets of an estate and that
there is a bonafide controversy between them concerning those assets."'' 54
The court of civil appeals held that the conflicting heirship claims were a
contested probate matter. 155
II. TRUSTS
Trustee Powers. In Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Roberts' 56 Colvin cre-
ated a trust in 1949 in which twenty-eight residential units were conveyed
to Jones as trustee with directions to rent or lease the properties. Jones
employed a realty company to handle the properties. The question was
whether the fees paid to the realty company were expenses of Jones or the
trust estate. Construing article 7425b-25H(l) of the Texas Trust Act, 157
the Texas Supreme Court held that the employment of the realty company
was a proper expense of the trust.' 58
In Transamerican Leasing Co. v. Three Bears, Inc. 159 a trust owned fifty
percent of the stock in a lessee corporation. The lessee operated a restau-
rant business that would accrue to the benefit of the trust. The trust instru-
ment conferred upon the trustees the power to invest in leases. The Texas
149. 598 S.W.2d at 356. In another action Hitt was denied reimbursement for attorneys'
fees incurred in the removal action because he was acting in his own personal interest.
Dumitrov v. Hitt, 601 S.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ
ref d n.r.e.).
150. 601 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
151. Id at 189.
152. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(b) (Vernon 1980).
153. 601 S.W.2d at 190.
154. Id
155. Id
156. 597 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1980).
157. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-25H(l) (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
158. 597 S.W.2d at 754. Jones died shortly after the suit was filed, and his independent
executor, Corpus Christi Bank & Trust, was substituted as defendant. Id at 753. The
supreme court affirmed the judgments against the trustee's estate for his failure to distribute
the proper amounts to the beneficiaries of the trust.-Id at 755.
159. 586 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1979).
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Supreme Court construed that provision to include a guarantee of a
lease.160 Accordingly, the court held that the trustees' action in guarantee-
ing payment under a lease of restaurant equipment was within their pow-
ers under the trust instrument. 161
In Dedulio v. Law/er 162 William Robert Lawler, Sr. created the Lawler
Family Trusts in 1968 and Roger Lawler was empowered to remove trust-
ees and appoint successor trustees. In 1972 Nicoladze was sole trustee and
Roger Lawler acted as manager of the trust. Both entered into real estate
transactions in which each profited individually by causing certain land to
be conveyed to the Lawler Family Trusts for a note in the amount of
$950,000. The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment
that the trustee and manager had not acted in the interest of the trusts and
that, consequently, the note should be cancelled and the trust restored as
nearly as possible to its former status. 63
Spendthrft Trust. In Myrick v. Moody National Bank 164 a trust had been
created pursuant to a divorce decree that was to provide for the education
of the spouses' children. The husband-father agreed that disbursements to
him from certain other trusts of which the Moody Bank was trustee would
be pledged for the creation of the educational trust. Upon his failure to
fund the educational trust, the former wife sued for the amounts due the
trust and instituted garnishment proceedings against the trustee bank. The
bank defended on the grounds that the trusts were spendthrift trusts and
could not be garnished. The trial court held that the trust proceeds were
garnishable for the husband's child support obligations, but not for his
obligation to fund the education trust. 165 The judgment was not appealed
and became final. In this subsequent action Myrick and the bank at-
tempted to relitigate the issue, and the cotrt of civil appeals held that the
garnishability issues were barred by res judicata.1 66 It did, however, re-
mand for findings as to the priority of the application of the garnished
funds to the educational trust, child support, attorneys' fees, and other
items. ' 67
Charitable Trust. In City of Wichita Falls v. Kemp Public Library Board of
Trustees ' 68 Kemp had donated money to the city to build a public library.
Kemp had conditioned the gift on the requirements that an independent
board of trustees would be established to manage the library and that the
city could continue to provide the library with continued financial support.
A dispute arose years later, and the library board sought a determination
160. Id at 475.
161. Id
162. 593 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
163. Id at 842-43.
164. 590 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1979, writ retd n.r.e.).
165. Id at 768.
166. Id
167. Id at 769.
168. 593 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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of the charitable trust relationship between the board and the city. The
district court found that the library constituted a charitable trust. 169 The
court of civil appeals reversed, holding that no charitable trust existed be-
cause no intent could be found on the part of Kemp to create an express
trust.' 70 The court stated that an intent to create a trust could not be im-
puted on the mere basis of conditioning a gift on continued financial sup-
port.'
7 1
Constructive Trust. In Batmanis v. Batmanis "' suit was brought to deter-
ine the property interests of the decedent's daughter by a first marriage and
the surviving wife of his second marriage. The evidence showed that the
husband collected rents and dividends from the properties that were his
first wife's community half interest. These sums were invested and the
court held that they could be traced into other accounts where they should
be deemed as held in trust for the daughter of the first marriage. 73 The
case was remanded for further findings as to the proper tracing of funds
from the first marriage and the community funds of the second mar-
riage. 174
III. FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
Power ofAppointment. In Patterson v. United States 175 the husband left his
estate to his wife for life with remainders to his children. The wife was
given the "right. . .to sell, convey or encumber any or all of said prop-
erty, and to receive, use and appropriate the proceeds thereof." 176 Another
clause required that the surviving wife, as co-executrix, could exercise her
powers in that capacity only with the consent of her son as co-executor.
The federal district court held that the widow in her individual capacity
had a taxable general power of appointment; only her exercise of those
powers in her representative capacity required the consent of her son.177
Attorneys' Fees-Deductibility. Malone v. United States 78 concerned the
deductibility of attorneys' fees as administration expenses under Texas
law. The attorneys had entered into a fifty percent contingent fee contract
for recovery of estate taxes previously paid, and the estate sought to deduct
the fees as expenses of the estate in calculating the estate tax payable. The
federal district court allowed the deduction only up to one-third of the
recovery. 179 The court reasoned that section 233 of the Probate Code' 80
169. Id at 835.
170. Id. at 836.
171. Id.
172. 600 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. Id. at 889.
174. Id at 891.
175. 499 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
176. Id at 492 n.3.
177. Id at 494.
178. 493 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
179. Id at 529.
180. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 233 (Vernon 1980).
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provides for as much as a one-third contingent fee in recovery actions, and
section 242181 provides for the allowance of fees and expenses. 182 The
court concluded that the statutes, when read together, indicated that a one-
third contingent fee was the reasonable fed under Texas law and thus was
the upper limit of deductibility for federal estate tax purposes.183
181. Id § 242.
182. 493 F. Supp. at 529.
183. Id
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